Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents
Abstract
We present the first monotone randomized polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS) for minimizing the makespan of parallel related machines ($Q||C_{\max}$), the paradigmatic problem in single-parameter algorithmic mechanism design. This result immediately gives a polynomial-time, truthful (in expectation) mechanism whose approximation guarantee attains the best-possible one for all polynomial-time algorithms (assuming $P\neq NP$). Our algorithmic techniques are flexible and also yield a monotone deterministic quasi-PTAS for $Q||C_{\max}$ and a monotone randomized PTAS for max-min scheduling on related machines.
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Copyright © 2011 Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics.
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Submitted: 29 December 2008
Accepted: 6 April 2011
Published online: 23 June 2011
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